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Aristotle, Dialectic and Critical Realism
Scott Mann
Ths paper sets out to show that central aspects of Arstotle’s vew of scence are of 
contnued contemporary relevance. It argues that a wdespread falure to recognse 
ths derves, n part, from a contnued commtment to Humean deas. And t shows 
how Roy Bhaskar’s realst crtque of Humeansm hghlghts some of the strengths of 
Arstotelan ontology and methodology.
Introduction
It s frequently asserted that Arstotle’s vews of scence are of purely hstorcal nter-
est, wth lttle relevance to contemporary scentfic methods or results. When natural 
scentsts reflect upon the hstory of ther dscplnes, Arstotle’s deas often figure sm-
ply as an llustraton of the dangers of a pror theorsng wthout recourse to proper 
controlled expermentaton. 
It s apparent that scentfic research has moved a long way snce Arstotle’s day, 
wth major elements of Arstotelan scence refuted by subsequent nvestgaton. 
However, ths paper argues that at a deeper methodologcal and ontologcal level, 
some of hs key deas are far from outdated, and retan a lvely relevance for contem-
porary scence.
In some cases at least, a falure to recognse the contemporary sgnficance of 
Arstotelan methodology and ontology derves from contnued commtment to a 
Humean emprcsm whch s ndeed qute counter-posed to such Arstotelan deas. 
But whle some natural scentsts stll see Humean deas as provdng a phlosoph-
cal foundaton for contemporary natural scence, there are now comparatvely few 
phlosophers who would agree wth them. On the contrary, there s an ncreasng rec-
ognton that Humean deas are fundamentally ncompatble wth growth and devel-
opment of scentfic knowledge. 
Amongst contemporary phlosophers of scence, Roy Bhaskar has played a par-
tcularly sgnficant role n refutng the clam for any such Humean foundatons for 
modern scence, and therefore — n the process — refutng contemporary crtcsms 
of Arstotle bult upon Humean deas. And whle Bhaskar hmself acknowledges no 
partcular debt to Arstotle n the development of hs own crtcal realst approach to 
scence, there reman good grounds for seeng crtcal realsm as bult upon Arstote-
lan ontology and methodology.
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Bhaskar’s Critical Realism
Roy Bhaskar’s crtcal realst phlosophy s crtcal because t s opposed to nstru-
mentalsm — the dea that scentfic theores are no more than tools for makng 
predctons. It s opposed to conventonalsm, the dea that “knds” are just human 
constructons, that nature tself has no nbult dfferentaton of knds of thngs. 
It s opposed to methodologcal ndvdualsm and reductonsm n socal theory, 
the dea that socal phenomena are essentally effects of the ntentonal actons and 
nteractons of human ndvduals.
The approach s realst because t sees scence as a search for real causes and real 
knds of thngs, ncludng underlyng structures and mechansms that create and 
mantan the world as perceved. It sees socal structure and socal relatons as havng 
ther own realty, not reducble to anythng else, ncludng real causal powers to shape 
and nfluence human ntentons and actons.
In a seres of wrtngs from 1975, Bhaskar also hghlghts the central mportance 
of dalectcal thnkng n phlosophcal realsm and n the development of scence. 
The key concept of dalectc s that of qualtatve change, development and progress 
acheved n and through contradcton. Contradcton s seen as the drvng force of 
development of deas or theores; and as the force of development and change n the 
enttes, structures and relatons of the materal and socal world.
At the conceptual level, the elucdaton of the true meanng and mplcatons of 
a partcular dea or theory, ncludng assumptons underlyng, or emprcal conse-
quences flowng from, the dea, s seen to generate another dea or observaton, whch 
apparently contradcts the orgnal dea. Such contradcton drves the development 
of some deeper or broader pcture whch allows for the reconclaton or ntegraton 
of the deas concerned.
Humean Empiricism
In Bhaskar’s earler work the prncpal thess under consderaton s Davd Hume’s 
emprcst epstemology and ts mpled ontology of experences and events. The 
problem les n the emprcst assumpton that such a world makes sense n and of 
tself, and sets the lmts of scentfic knowledge, wth causaton dentfied wth smple 
nductve generalsaton.
We can certanly dentfy patterns n the world as perceved whch sustan nductve 
generalsaton, ncludng correlatons of contguous events, as consdered by Hume. 
Hume defines causaton n terms of perceved regularty of successon of events, wth 
the former dentfied as cause of the latter, purely as a consequence of human expecta-
ton. But the Humean scheme s deeply contradctory, nsofar as the causaton of such 
expectaton tself seems to nvolve actual producton of the effect by the cause.
Perceved regulartes can be drectly ndcatve of causaton, but ths need not 
be the case, and real causaton nvolves a partcular sort of nternal relaton of natu-
ral necesstaton, producton or generaton. We do, n many cases, drectly perceve 
genunely causal relatons as the actual exercse of the powers of thngs to nfluence 
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themselves or other thngs. But there reman many assocatons of attrbutes of per-
sstng objects and conjunctons of events where we cannot drectly perceve relevant 
causes that generate and explan such assocatons.
We need to dstngush drectly causal from accdental or ndrectly causal rela-
tons and we need to understand the underlyng mechansms whch sustan genu-
nely causal relatons and thereby explan perceved stablty and transformaton. To 
access such mechansms we need to move beyond percepton to construct theoret-
cal models of the structures or mechansms concerned, by analogy wth mechansms 
we can perceve or do already understand. Such an abstract model can be seen as the 
antthess of the orgnal concrete percepton. 
The synthess nvolves a return to the surface appearance, wth such appearance 
now understood as manfestaton or consequence of the exercse of the causal powers 
n queston. Insofar as the powers of mechansms are typcally trggered, or blocked, 
by ther relatons wth other such mechansms, then we need to consder such nter-
acton n order to explan the world-as-perceved.
Here we come to understand the persstence, and nature, of perceved structure, 
ncludng the qualtatvely dfferent orders of structure of the perceved world, n 
terms of the causal nteracton of the component parts of that structure, wth each 
other, wth the structure tself and wth ts envronment. Natural knds of thngs 
exst as “homeostatc clusters” of components (Kornblth, 1993). In the case of water, 
for example, we find observable propertes, of lqudty, power to dssolve salts etc, 
explaned by reference to underlyng molecular structure.1
To the extent that stablty of such components depends, n part, upon the nterac-
ton of ther own component parts, we confront a regress of explanaton through df-
ferent, ontologcal, levels of structure. Crtcal realsm posts an ontologcal herarchy 
of structural levels of organsaton, wth new, and characterstc, emergent propertes 
of each level, physcal, chemcal, bologcal, socal. 
Contextual consderatons, of nteracton of structures, are crucal to the ssue of 
testng such models, by reference to observatons other than those whch orgnally 
motvated ther constructon. We verfy the model, or establsh the realty of the mech-
ansm n queston, by reference to novel predctons concernng the operaton of ts 
causal powers n dfferent crcumstances. Such verficaton can be seen as the defintve 
synthess or reconclaton of percepton and magnaton, of observaton and theory. 
Aristotle’s Ontology
Whle Bhaskar makes reference to numerous dfferent phlosophcal and scentfic 
deas n process of developng hs deas, he has generally lttle to say about Arstotle’s 
contrbuton.2 But there seem to be good grounds for tracng many of the key deas of 
Bhaskar’s crtcal realsm back to Arstotle’s work. 
1 The behavour of bodes of water depends also upon structural features of the bodes n queston. 
2 In Bhaskar, 1978, whch lays the groundwork for all the deas consdered here, Arstotle appears only 
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In Arstotle’s work, the dea of a conceptual dalectcal method becomes explct as 
a gudng prncple of all hs nvestgatons of phlosophy, scence, ethcs and poltcs. 
Ths ncludes the dea that all theores serously developed and entertaned by learned 
folk are lkely to have some mportant kernel of truth, even though such theores 
mght conflct wth, or contradct, one another n mportant respects.
Arstotle characterstcally sought a mddle way between contrary postons that 
had sustaned ongong debate. As far as fundamental ontologcal consderatons are 
concerned, the competng postons were the materalsm of the Ionans and the ato-
msts on the one hand, and the Pythagorean-Platonc emphass upon mathematcal 
or geometrcal form or structure on the other. 
Arstotle’s emprcal orentaton and detaled studes of lvng organsms probably 
provded both motvaton and means for transcendng such dchotomes. The lvng 
world nvolved levels of complexty and functon not readly explcable n terms of 
the smplstc models of hs predecessors. So too dd such bologcal forms provde 
alternatve models or analoges whch could be extended nto other areas.
Arstotle was partcularly concerned wth the realty, complexty and dversty of 
qualtatve change n both the bologcal world and that of human materal produc-
tve actvty. The bologcal world s full of examples of complex structures, exercsng 
causal powers to brng about change n themselves and n other thngs, comng nto 
beng and passng away. Generalsng from these observatons, Arstotle concluded 
that change and potentalty, brth, growth, self-movement, nteracton and decay of 
complex structure are fundamental processes n the world.
Arstotle was aware that human lfe, percepton and understandng depend upon 
the relatve stablty of the basc consttuents of the materal world, allowng for 
nductve extrapolaton from sample to populaton, from past to future. It therefore 
made sense to focus upon the concrete bodes of ordnary percepton as the basc con-
sttuents of the world, and upon how these sorts of thngs come to have the specfic 
characters they do have, how they come nto beng, persst and go out of exstence.
In the Metaphyscs, Arstotle noted that “thngs are called substances n two ways; 
whatever s the ultmate subject, whch s no longer sad of anythng else, and what-
ever, beng ths so and so, s also separable”. (Arstotle, 2004:zeta 3, 175). He focused 
on thngs whch can be pcked out, dentfied, ndvduated, as bearers of partcular 
propertes, or nstances of partcular knds; thngs whose exstence s not a matter of 
some other thngs beng modfied n some way or other (Barnes, 1982:44). A thng 
s the partcular thng t s n vrtue of certan essental propertes or attrbutes whch 
determne that, and hence explan how, t s that partcular knd of thng t s. Thngs 
also have qualtes whch are nessental, whch could have been dfferent wthout 
makng them a dfferent knd of thng. 
In these terms, we can equate change of substance wth the comng nto beng or 
gong out of exstence of such “real” enttes; — change of essental qualtes. Change 
of qualty, by contrast, nvolves merely some alteraton of such a substance, whch stll 
n a sngle footnote. Whle there are more references to hs work n some of Bhaskar’s later wrtngs, t 
s allotted no sgnficant role n the development of crtcal realst theory.
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retans ts essental dentty as a partcular thng, or knd of thng. Change of quantty 
s growth or dmnuton and change of place s moton n space.
Arstotle reconcled ths concept of abdng substance wth the realty of change 
by reference to central elements of both Parmendean and Pythagorean theory. He 
argued for the essentally composte character of all substances as untes of both 
matter and form. There can be no form wthout matter — nsofar as form s noth-
ng more than organzaton of matter. But equally there can be no matter wthout 
form — wthout some sort of organzaton, shape, structural relatons of compo-
nent parts. Matter s what makes the partcular a unque ndvdual, n the sense of 
occupyng a partcular regon of space and tme. Form s what makes the partcular 
an nstance of a partcular — qualtatvely dstnct — type or knd of thng.
Arstotle agreed wth Parmendes that t s not possble for somethng — n the 
form of materal substance or matter — to arse out of nothng. At the same tme, he 
embraced the Pythagorean noton that what makes a thng the partcular sort of thng 
t s, has as much to do wth ts structure as wth ts materal content. He recognzed 
the realty of new, emergent propertes, powers and potentaltes of matter n vrtue 
of the partcular organzaton or structural arrangement of that matter. 
In ths context, we can begn to apprecate the nature and dversty of processes 
of change. In some cases there s change of matter wthout change of form — as wth 
bologcal growth and metabolsm. In some cases there s change of form wthout 
change of matter — as e.g. the change from lump of clay to pot. In some cases, the 
prncple of change s nternal to the changng substance; n others t s external.
Substances whch contan wthn themselves ther own prncples of growth and 
movement are sad to “exst by nature”. Such constructed objects as statues possess 
such “nternal” powers only dervatvely, by vrtue of the materals from whch they 
are constructed — as n ths case, mostly earth and water, gvng the statue the power 
to fall f unsupported (or ther capacty to respond to or motvate the actons of exter-
nal agents).3
The permanence of the world as a whole depends upon ndestructble matter whch 
passes from ndvdual to ndvdual. All hgher order sublunary bengs consst of 
specfic organsatons of the prmary elements, earth, ar, fire and water — whch under-
go nteracton and transmutaton, but never come from or pass nto nothngness.4
The permanence of the ndvdual depends, at least n part, upon essental features 
of the organzaton of ther consttuent matter, features whch, n some cases, allow 
for and depend upon an “exchange” of matter wth the ambent envronment, wthout 
loss of that essental structure.
Arstotle makes clear that matter and form are relatve concepts. What s form 
at one level of descrpton, a pece of wood as a configuraton of earth and water for 
3 In chapter two of the Physics, Arstotle nssts that every change s due to an agent actng on a patent, 
by contact, as change of form, wth change located n the patent. But n many cases an agent acts upon 
tself to produce change and not all changes are changes of form.
4 When Arstotle dentfies prmary elements as “powers” he emphasses ther exstence only wth spe-
cfic forms. Earth exsts as rocks or statues, whch, by vrtue of ther elemental composton, have the 
power to tp a scale.
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5 A hgher order structure preserves some, but not all, propertes of ts consttuents; a human has mass 
by vrtue of ther physcal consttuents.
example, becomes matter for a hgher level structure, a wooden bed for example. 
As he says, “even f we assume that all thngs are produced from the same prmary 
materal, or from the same thngs as prmary materals, and that t s the same mat-
ter whch serves as prncple of all products, t s stll the case that each thng has ts 
proper matter” (Arstotle, 2004:Eta 4, 243).
Just as n Bhaskar’s crtcal realst approach, Arstotle’s ontology of matter and 
form gves rse to a herarchcal concepton of the physcal world, nsofar as smpler 
or lower-level forms become matter for hgher order forms of organsaton or struc-
ture, wth new, hgher-order emergent propertes, n addton to propertes of ther 
consttuents.5
The Four Causes
All of these deas come together n Arstotle’s account of “the four causes”, wth all 
four nvolved n a comprehensve or adequate explanaton of any real world devel-
opment. All thngs have some materal content — and therefore such matter wll 
be nvolved n determnng the propertes of such thngs and n shapng events and 
transformatons concernng them. The fact that a statue s made of bronze s mpor-
tant n explanng ts beng brown and heavy.
Smlarly, all thngs have some organzaton or structure of such materal content — 
whch makes them the partcular sorts of thngs they are — n ths case, a statue. And 
agan, such form s crucal n explanng the “powers” of such thngs to “generate” 
or produce partcular sorts of effects. The fact that a statue s a representaton of an 
unknown solder e.g. mght determne ts power to produce a partcular emotonal 
response n certan onlookers.
The efficent cause seems rather less “unversal” or “necessary” nsofar as t seems 
to nvolve the nterventon of some external agent actng upon the partcular substance 
n queston. However, t s clear that substances cannot create themselves — so that, at 
some stage, such external agency must be nvolved n order to brng them nto beng.
Furthermore, nsofar as partcular forms confer powers of self movement (self-
mantenance, etc.) upon partcular sorts of matter, then t s qute possble for formal 
and efficent causes to concde. And many external causes functon as “trggers” or 
“releasers” for such “nternal” powers or tendences.
Some would say that the concept of goal or purpose s relevant only to the case of 
human acton where partcular belefs and desres are elements of efficent causes of 
bodly movement. But for Arstotle all form confers upon ts materal “bearer” some 
basc goal or purpose — as well as the powers whch allow t (n approprate crcum-
stances) to realze such a goal or purpose. So that reference to such a goal “explans” 
partcular aspects of “form” whch contrbute to “realzaton” of such a purpose.
Once we recognse that all perceved stablty and endurance n the natural and 
socal world depends upon some sort of actve self mantenance of structure at some 
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level, once we come to see natural knds of thngs as “homeostatc clusters” of prop-
ertes, so do see how functonal analyss at least, whch dentfies the role of relevant 
components n such self-mantenance, s very wdely applcable to the physcal, as 
well as to the bologcal and socal world. Ths provdes some vndcaton for Ars-
totelan teleology. And clams to the contrary notwthstandng, Arstotelan efficent 
causaton bears no relaton to Humean successonst causaton as mere contguty. 
Even efficent causes nvolve agents or mechansms of causaton wth the power to 
generate or brng about partcular effects.
The detals of Arstotle’s Cosmology dffer from those of present day scence. But 
the basc ontologcal prncples, of substances as natural knds, of herarches of mat-
ter and form, of the four causes, are very close to those dentfied by Roy Bhaskar 
and other crtcal realsts as necessary for makng sense of the possblty, nature and 
progress of modern scence. 
The Scientific Revolution
Ths rases the queston of why Bhaskar and other crtcal realsts have so radcally 
neglected ther Arstotelan roots. A possble explanaton s the mportance they allot 
to Galleo’s revolutonary methodologcal nsghts n fuellng the scentfic revoluton 
from the seventeenth century onwards. Unlke Arstotle, Galleo recognsed that the 
nherent complexty of nteracton of forces and powers n the physcal world, n-
cludng the blockng of the operaton of some such powers by others, means that 
the observed patterns of structure or behavour of thngs of the world frequently 
fal to drectly reflect deeper, underlyng laws, structures, or mechansms. But ths 
need not prevent us from dscoverng such underlyng structures and mechansms, 
provdng we are able to develop approprate powers of analytcal abstracton, both 
n terms of magnatve thought experments and actual laboratory expermenta-
ton.
Arstotle faled to recognse the need for expermentaton n the modern sense, of 
solatng specfic mechansms as much as possble, to see what they do “on ther own”, 
rather than n conjuncton wth all the others that normally modfy, or nullfy, ther 
effects. Such solaton requres, n the first nstance, some magnatve constructon of 
the sorts of forces nvolved. It can then nvolve complex physcal actvtes, mobls-
ng other forces n order to try to “cancel out” or temporarly neutralse partcular 
nterferng forces so as to leave the way free for observaton of the partcular force or 
tendency of acton n queston. As Bhaskar emphasses, modern research laboratores 
are complex systems created for ths purpose, of generatng hghly artfical closed 
systems of ths knd (Bhaskar, 1986:35).
Arstotle’s conspcuous falure n relaton to dynamcs can be attrbuted to hs fal-
ure to consder the possblty of solaton of a sublunary body from the effects of 
frcton and gravty. And he faled to formulate the basc prncples of a controlled 
experment. 
Hs prmary nterest n bology, rather than physcs, probably contrbuted to hs 
falure to recognse the true sgnficance of quanttatve consderatons. Ths, more 
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than anythng else, probably underles the dsmssve approach to hs work on the 
part of many contemporary physcsts. 
On the other hand, Arstotle dentfied proportonalty or concomtant varaton 
between dependent and ndependent varables as major form of expresson of phys-
cal law. He had hs own conservaton law, of prmary substance, pre-figurng later 
physcal conservaton prncples. 
Many of the new knds whch are sgnficant objects of contemporary scence have 
emerged by vrtue of the extenson of human perceptual powers through the use of 
technology not avalable to Arstotle. They have been found to have ther own per-
ceptble propertes and powers, whch have turned out to be comprehensble n terms 
of the structural organsaton of ther consttuent materals, n nteracton wth ther 
ambent envronment of other thngs. We stll understand such thngs by reference to 
ther structure, ther composton, the forces bearng upon them, as well as the forces 
they exert on other thngs, and the functonal ntegraton of ther parts.
Arstotle was correct n argung that the world s ntrnscally comprehensble n 
vrtue of basc structural regularty and contnuty — allowng extrapolaton from 
lmted observatons. He was correct n argung that the varous specalsed dsc-
plnes each deal wth “laws” expressng specfic behavoural tendences, powers or 
possbltes of acton exhbted by thngs-n-the-world n vrtue of specfic dmen-
sons of ther structure.
Arstotle’s core deas have been confirmed tme and agan by the subsequent 
progress of scence up to the present day. And they are precsely the deas hgh-
lghted by crtcal realst ontology. The characterstcs and powers of knds of thngs 
as perceved, of the knds nto whch we are naturally nclned to classfy objects, by 
vrtue of the perceved characterstcs and powers n queston, are generally explca-
ble n terms of underlyng structures of organsaton of the component materals of 
such knds, and the nteracton of such structures wth ther ambent envronments 
of other thngs.
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